Introduction
 Fibre-to-the-Premises (FTTP) for most homes and business premises (93%) in Australia;
 Fixed Wireless access for a small proportion of premises (4%) in regional areas;  Satellite access via some purpose-built satellites for premises (3%) in remote areas.
The vast majority of the access build was FTTP. Mr Quigley described it as having two parts: a 'greenfields FTTP' for newly built premises; and a 'brownfields FTTP' replacing the current telecommunications networks to existing premises. He claimed that the greenfields FTTP solution was, in 2013, 'running below the budgeted cost and was keeping up with the growing demand from housing developers'. His main emphasis in the talk was on 'brownfields FTTP', as this had been the most contentious issue regarding technology.
Mr Quigley noted that, in addition to the access portion of the NBN, other essential technology successfully delivered during his time as CEO included:
 The transit network (consisting of 'more than 65,000 km of fibre links and about 1,000 access nodes') that connects the NBN access networks to the Points of 
The FTTP Rollout in Brownfields Areas
The 'brownfields FTTP' rollout has been the most contentious area of the NBN plan. It is the future rollout of this part of the NBN that has been replaced, after the NBN Strategic Review (NBN, 2013) , with a mix of reusing the current Hybrid Fibre-Coax (HFC) networks, built by Telstra and Optus in the 1990s, and a new build of Fibre to the Node (FTTN), which reuses Telstra's copper distribution network. The debate over cost will be described in the next section, while here we discuss progress in the rollout itself.
Plan in 2010. They were 'perhaps … too ambitious' and were not achieved for brownfields FTTP. There were some trials in 2011, but the volume rollout did not begin until early 2012.
A major cause of the delay was the time taken to conclude a deal with Telstra for access to its ducts and other access infrastructure. This deal, including its approval by the ACCC, took longer than had been anticipated, and caused a delay of nine months in the schedule. Mr Quigley was silent on why the deal had taken longer to finalise than had been planned, but he outlined the complexity of it. He noted that a 'mandatory requirement in that original deal was Telstra taking responsibility for ensuring everything they provided to NBN Co was fit for purpose'. In other words, Telstra was required to take on some of the project risk from NBN Co.
The rollout volumes rose from the start of 2013 and reached a peak of about 90,000 premises passed in the June quarter. After that, volumes declined again when a problem of asbestos in Telstra pits was discovered, leading to less than 50,000 premises passed in the December quarter. Telstra resolved the asbestos issue during the second half of 2013, but by September the Coalition Government had been elected and was de-emphasising FTTP. During the question and answer segment at the end of the formal talk, one questioner asked for comment on the enormous difficulties in cost and schedule experienced by the construction companies engaged by NBN Co to build the brownfields FTTP. The questioner noted that all the companies had lost money. Mr Quigley's answer was enlightening. He suggested that the NBN was 'not a typical construction project', more 'like a distributed factory'. That is, one should treat the rollout like a production line, learning over time how to optimize the construction processes. He felt that the construction companies would have learnt how to do this but they were stopped before they became good at it.
What of the alternative technologies? The FTTN rollout has now started to ramp up (Mr One can conclude, therefore, that revenues would have held up in the FTTP version of the NBN, which, together with cost reductions for premises passed, would lead to a peak funding commitment of $45 billion, as planned. Whether this would have come to pass we will now never know.
For the current, MTM-based NBN, the peak funding target is $49 billion. The great imponderable in this is the integration and upgrade of the existing HFC facilities. The costs are still to be fully worked out as detailed design work progresses. The history of NBN costing would suggest that the costs have been underestimated. This could be material to the overall cost, as the HFC is a significant component of the current NBN, with about 3 million premises passed out of a total of 10 or 11 million.
The NBN Satellites
The number of satellites to be launched to provide service to outer regional and remote premises has also been a matter of contention. Mr Quigley recalled 'hours spent in Joint Parliamentary committees defending NBN Co's decision to design and launch two satellites'. This was due to the then Opposition's assertion that they would not be fully utilised and were too expensive. In the event, however, the NBN Corporate Plan from August 2015 has confirmed that at least two satellites would be needed.
In answer to a question, Mr Quigley noted that the satellites, although 'very sophisticated machines', have a limited capacity. It was always expected that some spot beams would become exhausted. Mr Quigley suggested that, as the NBN is 'a huge cash-generating machine', NBN Co could eventually extend the footprint of the Fixed Wireless access to relieve some of this congestion.
What the Future Holds
Whichever party is in government, Australia now will be provided with an NBN with a much lower proportion of FTTP than was originally envisaged. Whatever the technology, completing the full rollout by 2020 would be 'heroic'. Mr Quigley's estimate, given the current uncertainties surrounding the HFC component, is a completion date some time in
2022.
The rollout will probably continue to accelerate for some time to come and revenues for NBN Co will continue to increase. Capital costs of deployment per premises passed will eventually fall. Operating cash flows will be less than would have been achieved with the FTTP plan because maintenance costs for the FTTN and HFC will be greater than for FTTP.
The current NBN, as Mr Quigley noted, does not 'allow for any significant growth in … demand over the next 10 or 20 years', which is 'incredibly short-sighted'. He claimed that the revised technology plan 'has turned out to be short-sighted, expensive and backward looking'. Meanwhile, others are turning away from FTTN in order to accommodate growth.
He cited the examples of AT&T, which is facing demand in the US for faster broadband speeds than can be delivered with FTTN, and BT, which is under pressure from the British regulator, Ofcom, to take a 10-year perspective on fibre access. If the long-term vision for the NBN is 'a future-proof FTTP solution', it is 'now going to happen over a longer period and at a greater cost to taxpayers' than was envisaged in 2009.
The effective disinformation campaign -or, if one prefers, the NBN estimates put forward in good faith but which later largely proved misleading -mounted by the Coalition will continue to colour perceptions of the NBN, no matter how well it performs and how efficiently NBN Co executes the plan. The nation-building vision of the NBN, whereby Australia would have been equipped with modern, high-speed Internet infrastructure, almost certainly has been lost.
One aspect of this sorry saga that will continue to have repercussions, but was not mentioned by Mr Quigley, is the ad hominem attacks made on his reputation by the Coalition. Mr Quigley rose in Alcatel to be one of the most influential Australians ever in the global telecommunications industry. That his reputation was attacked in the pursuit of political advantage is to be deprecated. It can only be hoped that other, well experienced Australians will not be deterred by his experience from contributing their knowledge and leadership to future Government projects.
